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I. Introduction
There are no inherently correct criteria for determining whether
regulations restricting uses of property violate the Takings Clause.  The 
regulatory takings concept is a judicial construct that has the potential to be 
expansively applied.  Justice Scalia underscored its judicial origins by 
explaining in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that “[p]rior to Justice 
Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was generally 
thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of 
property, or the functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] 
* Supervising Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice.  I
am most grateful to John Echiverria for his comments on earlier drafts.  This article 
reflects the views of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the 
California Department of Justice. 
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possession.’”1 And Justice Stevens warned about potential over-application 
of this judicial creation in his Dolan v. City of Tigard2 dissent:  
The so-called “regulatory takings” doctrine that the Holmes 
dictum [ ] kindled has an obvious kinship with the line of 
substantive due process cases that Lochner exemplified. Besides 
having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-
ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic 
regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.3
Susceptibility for abuse exists where, in contrast to government’s 
condemnation or physical appropriation of property, “a taking has occurred 
because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are 
tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is 
not self-evident.”4  
Some scholars use this lack of precision to advocate an aggressive 
interpretation of the Takings Clause.  Most notably, Professor Richard 
Epstein argues “that the eminent domain clauses and parallel clauses in the 
Constitution render constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the heralded 
reforms and institutions of the twentieth century: zoning, rent control, 
workers’ compensation laws, transfer payments, progressive taxation.”5  He 
asserts that when government “diminish[es] the rights of the owner in any 
fashion,” there is a prima facie taking “no matter how small the alteration.”6   
This article, in contrast, suggests that Supreme Court decisions, as 
well as Constitutional and practical considerations, call for rules that limit 
regulatory takings to extreme situations.  Those rules generally require, 
1. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted)
(quoting Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871); Transp. 
Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879)).  For a review of other Supreme Court 
decisions explaining that regulatory takings are a judicial creation, as well as how 
most, but not all scholars agree, see Daniel L. Siegel, How the History and Purpose of the 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine Help to Define the Parcel As A Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 603, 615-17 
(2012). 
2. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3. Id. at 406-07 (footnote omitted).  See also Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s use 
of a standard “that has been discredited for the better part of a century”). 
4. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 n.17 (2002). 
5. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: FORWARD TO PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN, at x (1985). 
6. Id. at 57.
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among other things, a showing that a regulation’s economic impact on 
property is severe, counting direct benefits that the owner receives as part of 
the impact calculation, and evaluating that impact by including potential 
future uses of the property (the “parcel as a whole”).   
II. Non-Physical Takings Require a Major Diminution in
Value
A. Supreme Court Opinions
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,7 the Supreme Court explained that it 
analyzes regulatory takings claims by using one of four tests.  Most are 
“governed by the standards set forth in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City.”8  Others come within the “two relatively narrow categories” exemplified 
by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp9 (permanent physical 
occupation) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council10 (denial of all economic 
value).11  Finally, there is “the special context of land-use exactions.”12 
Two of these tests—those used in Penn Central and in Lucas—rely to a 
significant extent on the economic impact of the regulation on the owner’s 
property.  Under Penn Central, courts focus on (i) “[t]he economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant;” (ii) “the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;” and (iii) “the 
character of the governmental action.”13  Under Lucas, where the challenged 
restriction “permanently deprives property of all value,” the economic 
impact is so severe that that there is usually a “per se” taking.14   
7. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
8. Id. at 538, referring to Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978). 
9. 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
10. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
11. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
12. Id.
13. 438 U.S. 104, 124.
14. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 332 (2002).  A regulation that removes all value from property is not always 
a taking.  Most notably, if “background principles of the State’s law of property and 
nuisance already place” similar restrictions upon the property, the regulation is not a 
taking.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
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Prior to Lucas, the Supreme Court addressed the level of economic 
impact needed to trigger a regulatory taking in Concrete Pipe and Products of 
California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California.15  While 
Lucas explained that a regulation that totally eliminates a property’s value 
likely triggers a per se taking, Concrete Pipe addressed the other side of the 
coin by suggesting that impacts need to start approaching that level to be 
takings:  
[O]ur cases have long established that mere diminution in the
value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate
a taking. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
384, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (approximately 75%
diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 36
S.Ct. 143, 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) (92.5% diminution).16
Penn Central itself makes the same point: “Appellants concede that the 
decisions sustaining other land-use regulations . . . uniformly reject the 
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish 
a ‘taking’ . . . .”17  Justice Scalia’s majority decision in Lucas includes a 
footnote furthering that point, but distinguishing regulations that render 
property valueless.  It explains that “in at least some cases the landowner 
with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will 
recover in full.”18  Lower federal court decisions, as well as most decisions 
reviewing state takings provisions, follow a similar approach.19   
15. 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
16. Id. at 645.
17. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).  The
seed for this concept was planted by Justice Holmes in Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 413 (1922), where his majority opinion explains that “[g]overnment hardly could 
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law.” 
18. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 n.8 (emphasis omitted).
19. For example, the Federal Court of Claims, which considers many regulatory
takings cases, has explained that “several Supreme Court decisions suggest that 
diminutions in value approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate the 
existence of a taking.  This court likewise has generally relied on diminutions well in 
excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking.”  Brace v U.S., 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 
357 (2006) (footnotes omitted).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently came 
to a similar conclusion in reviewing both the federal and Wisconsin takings clauses, 
explaining that to establish a claim, “the challenged government action must deprive 
a landowner of ‘all or substantially all practical uses of the property.’”  Bettendorf v. 
St. Croix County, 631 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  State court 
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Case law is not the only reason for requiring an extremely high 
economic impact to support a regulatory taking.  It is also needed to be 
consistent with the regulatory taking doctrine itself, and to address other 
constitutional requirements and practical considerations. 
B. Functional Equivalent to an Ouster
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,20 the Court engaged in its most recent 
comprehensive analysis of the regulatory taking doctrine.  The Court 
explained that the “paradigmatic taking” occurs when government directly 
appropriates or physically invades property.21  However, a regulation can 
amount to a taking when it is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a 
direct appropriation or ouster.”22  Regulatory takings tests thus attempt to 
identify restrictions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in 
which government ousts the owner from her domain.23   
Where government ousts the owner, the economic impact is not an 
issue, because the ouster itself “eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude 
others from entering and using her property-perhaps the most fundamental 
of all property interests.”24  But for an economic impact to be so onerous 
that it is similar to eliminating a core property interest, the impact has to be 
huge.  As the Federal Circuit has explained, a “severe economic deprivation” 
is therefore required by “the very nature of a regulatory takings claim.”25 
C. Separation of Powers
The major diminution requirement also promotes judicial adherence 
to the separation of powers principle that underlies the Constitution.  As the 
decisions similarly call for a remaining value that is “slightly greater than de 
minimus” (Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 
67 (Col. 2001)), a deprivation that is “one step short of complete” (Noghrey v. Town 
of Brookhaven, 852 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div. 2008)), or an impact that removes “all 
practical value” from the property.  E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., Inc. v. City of Portland, 
941 A.2d 457, 465 n. 7 (Me. 2008). 
20. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
21. Id. at 537.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 539.
24. Id.
25. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985), 
explaining that “under extreme circumstances” a governmental regulation can 
constitute a taking. 
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Court points out, that doctrine “restrains each of the three branches of the 
Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other 
two . . . .”26  The extreme economic impact requirement helps to prevent the 
judiciary from overstepping its constitutional bounds by using its regulatory 
takings creation as an “open-ended source[ ] of judicial power.”27  
The requirement is similar to the check that the Court imposed in 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,28 where it cabined the breath of the Taking Clause 
by discarding the “substantially advance legitimate state interests” takings 
test.  In doing so, the Court pointed to the “well established” reasons for 
deferring to legislative judgments regarding the need for regulations.29  The 
Court’s major diminution condition likewise respects the independent 
powers of the legislative (and executive) branches.   
D. Federalism
Boundless judicial authority would go beyond improperly intruding 
into the domain of the other federal branches of government.  Due to the 
application of the Takings Clause to states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,30 it would also give the federal judiciary unprecedented powers 
over state affairs.  As Professor Epstein has indicated, the Takings Clause 
could be used by the federal judiciary to override numerous areas that are 
traditionally governed at least in part by the States and their subdivisions, 
such as “zoning, rent control, workers’ compensation laws, transfer 
payments [and] progressive taxation.”31   
Excessive authority over state actions, however, would clash with the 
Founding Fathers’ recognition that “[t]he powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”32  That reservation goes to 
the core of our federal structure.  Its expression in The Federalist was 
subsequently embodied in the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, under 
which the United States must “guarantee to every State in this Union a 
26. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 (1997).
27. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J.
dissenting). 
28. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
29. Id. at 545.
30. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, (2001) (citing Chicago, B. &
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). 
31. See Epstein, supra note 5 Forward at x.
32. James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, in THE FEDERALIST 313 (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961) (1788). 
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Republican Form of Government.”33  It is further affirmed by the Tenth 
Amendment, which provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”34 
The Court has explained, however, that an unrestricted interpretation 
of the Constitution would convert federal courts into a “superlegislature.”35  
Federal judicial review of state property decisions could be particularly 
intrusive, and unwise, because as Justice Breyer has recognized, this is “an 
area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges.”36  Yet by overseeing 
state and local decisions as “a super zoning board or a zoning board of 
appeals,”37 federal courts would undermine the “strong policy considerations 
[that] favor local resolution of land-use disputes.”38  As Justice Alito 
explained while sitting on the Third Circuit, absent a high threshold for 
establishing a constitutional violation, courts would be “cast in the role of a 
‘zoning board of appeals.’”39  A strong economic impact standard is therefore 
needed to respect federalism by avoiding an overly intrusive involvement of 
the federal judiciary into the affairs of the States and their subdivisions.   
E. Indirect Benefits
In addition to constitutional reasons for requiring a major economic 
impact before a court can find a taking, that requirement takes into account 
the fact that government restrictions and other actions benefit property as 
well as burden it.  Where government actions that are part of the regulatory 
structure directly benefit property, such as by allowing additional 
development densities or reduced fees, that benefit should be measurable, 
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
35. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
36. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2619  (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
A unanimous Court made a related point in another takings decision, San Remo 
Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), where it explained that 
“state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving 
the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use 
regulations.”  Id. at 347. 
37. Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.1985).
38. Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d
Cir.1993). 
39. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392,
402 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (explaining why the “shocks the conscience” 
standard should apply to due process land use challenges).   
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and therefore part of the economic impact calculation itself, as discussed 
further below.40  Many governmental benefits, however, are more diffuse and 
thus difficult to calculate for a particular parcel.   
A leading Takings scholar has grouped the various positive effects of 
regulations and other government actions on land values into three broad 
categories: the amenity effect, the scarcity effect, and the givings effect.41  
The amenity effect occurs where a regulation creates an environment that 
enhances the value of property for a particular use.  This can at least 
partially offset the negative impact on a parcel.  For example, while requiring 
that an owner leave a portion of her residential lot as open space might 
reduce the parcel’s potential value, the lot’s worth could at the same time be 
increased if the same restriction is imposed on neighboring parcels and 
thereby creates a more attractive neighborhood.  Similarly, prohibiting 
industrial and commercial uses in residential neighborhoods can 
significantly enhance residential property values.   
An amenity effect can also occur in an agricultural community. 
Protecting farmland can promote the existence of the critical mass of farms 
needed for farm support activities, such as food processing plants, farm 
good suppliers, and transportation facilities.42  It can likewise prevent 
incompatible land uses, such as residential subdivisions whose inhabitants 
would likely object to and possibly bring nuisance suits due to the noise, 
odor, dust, and fumes that are often created by farming and livestock 
activities.43   
A regulation’s scarcity effect increases property values by limiting 
supply.  Regulations imposed in the Lake Tahoe Basin, for example, strictly 
limit the amount of new residential, tourist and commercial development in 
the region.44  That limitation creates a market scarcity, which in turn 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 70-86.
41. See JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON MEASURE 35,
GEORGETOWN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER (2007), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/102009property 
ValuesAndOregonMeasure37.pdf.  For a similar grouping, see Andrew W. Schwartz, 
Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 64-68 (2004). 
42. ECHEVERRIA, supra note 41, at 9-10.
43. See Bormann v. Bd. of Sup’rs In & For Kossuth County, 584 N.W.2d 309,
314, 322 (Iowa 1998), explaining the justification for statutory provisions that 
immunized farms in designated areas from certain nuisance suits, but nevertheless 
ruling that the immunity was unconstitutional.    
44. See TRPA Code of Ordinances, Chapter 50 (Allocation of Development),
available at http://www.trpa.org/documents/docdwnlds/ordinances/TRPA_Code_of_ 
Ordinances.pdf. 
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increases the value of properties that are developed, are potentially eligible 
for development or have Transferable Development Rights.45 
Finally, government expenditures and other actions can amount to 
“givings.”46  Using Lake Tahoe again as an example, between 1997 and 2010, 
the federal, state, and local governments spent over one and one quarter 
billion dollars on projects designed to improve the Lake Tahoe 
environment.47  This has not only included projects aimed at protecting the 
Lake’s spectacular clarity; it has also included adding many miles of bicycle 
and pedestrian trails, and a significant amount of new public access to the 
Lake.48  These enhancements greatly increase the desirability of living in and 
visiting Lake Tahoe, which in turn no doubt significantly boosts property 
values.  
The list of other ways in which government enhances property values 
and provides subsidies is virtually endless.  New highways and other 
transportation facilities can greatly increase land values by making property 
accessible for residential or commercial development, or by increasing 
consumer access to existing businesses.  Government’s redevelopment of an 
area can have a similarly positive impact on surrounding property values. 
The National Flood Insurance Program, combined with numerous federal, 
state, and local flood control actions, greatly enhance the value of flood 
plain properties.49  Agricultural subsidy programs significantly increase the 
value of agricultural lands.50  Property rights advocate Gideon Kanner 
colorfully summarizes givings as follows: 
The baker relies on roads that permit his suppliers and his 
customers to reach his shop, on maintenance of public safety 
that encourages people to go about their business that includes 
the patronage of his shop and the purchase of his baked goods, 
on regulation of utility rates that enable him to operate his 
baking ovens profitably, and on government food regulations 
45. See infra text accompanying notes 72-75 for a discussion of Transferable
Development Rights. 
46. For an extensive discussion of these types of governmental activities, see
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).  
47. See TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM:
HIGHLIGHTS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS (2011), available at http://www.trpa.org/documents/ 
docdwnlds/EIP/Update/EIP_4PG_ 2011_FNL.pdf. 
48. Id.
49. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (2003). 
50. ECHEVERRIA, supra note 41, at 28-29.
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that assure him and his customers of wholesome ingredients 
that go into his baked goods.51 
Although some of these and other governmental activities are in part 
supported by a property owner’s taxes, benefits are often far out of 
proportion to the taxes owners pay.  It is doubtful, for example, that taxes 
paid by Lake Tahoe property owners pay for the one and one quarter billion 
dollars that governments have paid to improve the Tahoe environment. 
Quantifying the increased value of individual properties due to these 
amenity, scarcity, and givings benefits, however, is generally very difficult.52  
That value is therefore best captured by simply requiring the plaintiff to 
establish a large economic impact.  
The difficulty in separately evaluating indirect benefits, rather than just 
accounting for them by setting a high economic impact bar, can be seen by 
looking at the Lake Tahoe development restrictions discussed in cases such 
as Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency.53  Lake Tahoe’s 
“exceptional clarity” was being threatened by an “upsurge of development.”54  
In response, the States of California and Nevada established the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, which over time significantly restricted new 
development.55  In this type of situation, how should courts measure the 
economic impact on the owner’s property? 
Courts generally evaluate economic impact by comparing the value of 
a parcel subject to the challenged regulation, to the value of a comparable 
parcel that is not subject to that regulation.56  The problem is that 
determining the value of a comparable but unregulated Lake Tahoe parcel is 
purely hypothetical.  To accurately reflect the impact if the regulation had 
not existed, the analysis needs to assume that the regulation does not apply 
to any parcel in the regulated jurisdiction, i.e., that there potentially could 
51. Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679, 754 
(2005).  See also William W. Wade & Robert L. Bunting, Average Reciprocity of Advantage: 
“Magic Words” or Economic Reality-Lessons from Palazzolo, 39 URB. LAW. 319, 364 (2007), 
where property rights advocates characterize scarcity and amenity effects as 
“conceptually correct” but assert that due to other market forces, those “effects do 
not automatically undermine appraisal values.” 
52. See also discussion in Schwartz, supra note 41, at 64-68.
53. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
54. Id. at 307-08.
55. Id. at 312.
56. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497
(1987) (“compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that 
remains in the property”). 
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be unlimited development throughout the area.  Moreover, the analysis 
would need to account for the scarcity and amenity effects by determining 
the impact that unlimited development’s impacts would have on the parcel’s 
price.  Unlimited development would eliminate the scarcity effect by 
increasing the supply of competing properties, and thereby reducing the 
property’s value.  It would also eliminate the amenity effect.  Unlimited 
development would cause environmental degradation that would make the 
parcel less attractive, such as in this example, a polluted Lake Tahoe,57 along 
with major increases in traffic, air pollution, and other impacts that would 
suppress the hypothetical parcel’s value.  Determining the value of that 
hypothetical parcel would involve extensive theory and relatively little 
empirical evidence.  A major diminution requirement helps to account for 
this uncertain nature of the economic evaluation.  It also acknowledges the 
existence of givings.   
The Court recognized the benefits concept in numerous regulatory 
takings cases, going back to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.58  In creating 
(perhaps inadvertently) the regulatory takings doctrine, Justice Holmes thus 
explained that the Court’s previous decision in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Com. of 
Pennsylvania59 held that a statute requiring coal mine owners to leave a pillar 
of coal along the border with a neighboring coal mine was not a taking 
because the statute “secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has 
been recognized as a justification of various laws.”60  The Court expanded 
upon that point in Penn Central, stating as follows:  
Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City 
Council that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York 
citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving 
the quality of life in the city as a whole—which we are unwilling 
to do—we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have 
in no sense been benefited by the Landmarks Law. Doubtless 
appellants believe they are more burdened than benefited by the 
57. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 341 (2002), explaining that property values throughout the region will 
increase if the regulations preserve the Lake’s “pristine state.”   
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. 232 U.S. 531 (1914).  Even before Plymouth Coal, the Court expressed this
concept.  In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911), the Court 
explained that “it would seem that there may be other cases beside the everyday one 
of taxation, in which the share of each party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual 
protection is sufficient compensation for the correlative burden that it is compelled 
to assume.” 
60. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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law, but that must have been true, too, of the property owners in 
Miller, Hadacheck, Euclid, and Goldblatt.61 
The Court’s subsequent decisions continued to recognize the importance of 
including indirect benefits in analyzing takings claims.  In Andrus v. Allard,62 
for example, the Court stated:  
It is true that appellees must bear the costs of these regulations. 
But, within limits, that is a burden borne to secure “the 
advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.” 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S., at 422, 43 S.Ct., at 
163 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We hold that the simple 
prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property in this case 
does not effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.63 
The court reiterated that point in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,64 
explaining: 
Under our system of government, one of the State’s primary ways 
of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals 
can make of their property. While each of us is burdened 
somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from 
the restrictions that are placed on others.65 
And writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reinforced this point in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council:66 
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no 
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it 
is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the 
legislature is simply “adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life,” Penn Central Transportation Co., 438  *1018 U.S., at 
124, 98 S.Ct., at 2659, in a manner that secures an “average 
reciprocity of advantage” to everyone concerned, Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160.67 
61. 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978).
62. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
63. Id. at 67-68.
64. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
65. Id. at 491.
66. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
67. Id. at 1017-18.
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By implication, Lucas affirmed that in a Penn Central analysis, which does not 
involve the extraordinary circumstance in which a regulation rendered land 
“valueless,”68 the Court should engage its normal assumption concerning 
reciprocity of advantage.   
In a Penn Central evaluation, the usual assumption that landowners 
indirectly benefit from numerous governmental actions is captured by 
requiring a very high economic impact.  Absent that requirement, property 
owners could use the Takings Clause to obtain windfalls.  In addition, as 
previously reviewed, the high impact is needed to avoid the federal judiciary 
overstepping the Constitution’s separation of powers constraint and its 
respect for State sovereignty.  
III. Direct Benefits
In contrast to indirect benefits, which as just discussed are difficult to
measure and are therefore accounted for by the major diminution in value 
requirement, direct benefits can be reasonably quantified.  As such, they 
should be part of the calculation of the property’s value of the property with 
the regulation in place.  The need to account for direct benefits in a Penn 
Central analysis is supported by Penn Central itself.  In that case, owners were 
restricted in their ability to develop historic properties, but in exchange local 
zoning laws gave them the right to increased development on nearby parcels 
that they already owned.  The Court explained that these benefits 
“undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on 
appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering 
the impact of the regulation.”69  The Federal Circuit, which sees a large 
volume of takings cases, thus explains that in evaluating whether a 
governmental action amounts to a taking, “available offsetting benefits must 
be taken into account generally, along with the particular benefits that 
actually were offered to the plaintiffs.”70 
There is some uncertainty, however, about exactly which direct 
benefits are relevant in determining whether a taking has occurred.  Most 
notably, in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,71 the Court reviewed 
Transferable Development Rights (TDRs).  Suitum involved Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency regulations that prohibited development on Ms. Suitum’s 
lot, but which provided allegedly valuable “Transferable Development 
Rights” (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners.  Suitum sued TRPA 
for an alleged taking, but did not first attempt to sell her TDRs.  TRPA 
therefore asserted that Suitum’s claim was not ripe.  The Court disagreed.  It 
68. Id. at 1020.
69. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
70. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
71. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
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held that no further discretionary act by TRPA was needed for there to be a 
“final decision,” because the particular TDRs available to Suitum were 
already known.   
The Suitum majority expressly avoided deciding whether TDRs that 
could be sold to a third party should be considered in determining whether 
government took property, as opposed to whether government provided just 
compensation for a taking.72  However, Justice Scalia, joined by two other 
justices, concurred in the judgment, opining that where the value of TDRs 
stems from their marketability to third parties, as opposed to the original 
owner’s ability to use them on property she owns, they are only relevant to 
the just compensation calculation.73  It is unclear, however, why TDRs should 
not be relevant to a taking analysis just because they are used by a third 
party.  They are marketable property interests that are part of a landowner’s 
bundle of sticks.  Where a court is evaluating a regulation’s economic 
impact, it should not matter that value exists because certain uses are 
permitted as opposed to the same value existing because the owner has 
TDRs.  The economic impact is identical.74   
Besides the question of exactly what direct benefits should be 
considered in the takings analysis, another unresolved issue is who has the 
burden of proof concerning those benefits.  There is no question that the 
claimant has the burden of proof concerning the economic impact of a 
regulation in general.75  A debate exists within the Federal Circuit, however, 
72. The Court specifically stated as follows:
While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDR’s both 
to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional 
requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and 
we do not decide, whether or not these TDR’s may be considered in 
deciding the issue whether there has been a taking in this case, as 
opposed to the issue whether just compensation has been afforded for 
such a taking. The sole question here is whether the claim is ripe for 
adjudication, even though Suitum has not attempted to sell the 
development rights she has or is eligible to receive. We hold that it is.  
Id. at 728-29. 
73. Id. at 747-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia contrasted the use of TDRs by a third party to the situation in Penn 
Central, where the landowners “owned at least eight nearby parcels, some 
immediately adjacent to the terminal, that could be benefited by the TDRs.”  Id. at 
749.  
74. For a review of other reasons for considering TDRs in evaluating economic
impact, see Paul Merwin, Caught Between Scalia and the Deep Blue Lake: The Takings Clause 
and Transferable Development Rights Programs, 83 MINN. L. REV. 815 (1999). 
75. See, for example, Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1288
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“the burden is on the owners to establish” the Penn Central factors). 
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concerning whether offsetting benefits are part of that burden.  In Cienega 
Gardens v. United States, writing for the majority in a six to one decision 
(involving an enlarged, but not en banc panel76),  Judge Dyk suggested that 
the owner’s burden includes the need to address regulatory provisions that 
are “specifically designed to ameliorate the impact of the” challenged 
regulation.77   
Subsequently, in a two to one decision, the majority in CCA Associates v. 
U.S. placed the burden on the government, stating that “[o]nce CCA came 
forward with evidence of an economic impact, the government then had the 
burden to establish any offsetting benefits which would mitigate or reduce 
the impact.”78  Dissenting in part, however, Judge Dyk emphatically pointed 
to his Cienega Gardens decision and to other opinions and asserted that 
owners have the burden of addressing offsetting benefits that are intended 
to mitigate a regulation’s economic impact, because that is part of the 
owners’ establishment of the Penn Central economic impact element.79  Judge 
Dyk contrasted the direct benefit situation from the indirect benefits in Rose 
Acre Farms, Inc. v. U.S.80  In Rose Acre, the government had “urge[d] that 
‘common sense’ dictates some consideration of the beneficial effects which 
the [Salmonella bacteria] regulations had on Rose Acre’s business and the 
egg industry as a whole.”81  But the government did not provide evidence of 
those effects.  The Federal Circuit rejected the argument, stating that while 
“[u]nder certain circumstances, regulatory action may confer an economic 
benefit on a party subject to the regulation . . . . [h]ere, the government 
points to no economic data in the record to support its assertion of 
offsetting benefits.”82  Judge Dyk explained that “Rose Acre involved indirect 
benefits flowing from the solution to the regulatory problem, rather than 
specific benefits provided to those affected by government regulation which 
were designed to ameliorate the impact of the regulation.”83   
A variation of Judge Dyk’s approach makes sense.  Judge Dyk might be 
interpreted as saying that absent proof, indirect benefits should be ignored. 
As previously explained, however, indirect benefits are very pervasive and 
real, and need to be accounted for in the economic impact analysis.84  The 
76. Id. at 1294, n.1.
77. 503 F.3d 1266, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
78. 667 F.3d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
79. Id. at 1251-54.
80. 559 F.3d 1260, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. CCA Associates at 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part; internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
84. See text supra accompanying notes 40-68.
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fact that they are difficult to quantify should be taken into account 
generically by setting a high economic impact threshold.  Judge Dyke is 
correct, however, that where benefits are direct they should be part of the 
impact calculation itself, and like other takings elements, owners have the 
burden of establishing that impact. 
IV. Parcel as a Whole
Simply requiring a high economic impact and an accounting for direct
benefits, however, provides insufficient guidance for a court to make an 
economic impact determination.  Before a court can ascertain the degree to 
which a regulation diminished a property’s value, it must decide what 
property will be analyzed in the first place.  If that “denominator”85 is limited 
to the regulated portion of one’s property, a taking will often be likely even 
with a high impact requirement.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
prevented that outcome with its “parcel-as-a-whole” rule.  The Court first 
articulated the rule in its pivotal Penn Central decision.86  The Penn Central 
Transportation Co., which owned Grand Central Terminal, asserted that New 
York City prohibited it from building an office structure above the Terminal 
and thereby took “a valuable property interest,” namely, Penn Central’s “‘air 
rights’ above the Terminal.”87  The Court, however, rejected that argument, 
famously explaining:  
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into 
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, 
this Court focuses rather . . . on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .88 
85. The courts have come to use the term “denominator” to describe the
property they will analyze. The term comes from Professor Frank Michelman’s 
seminal takings article, which describes the court’s task of analyzing a regulation’s 
economic impact on property as being based, in part, on looking at a fraction, with 
the numerator being the value with the regulation’s restrictions and the denominator 
being the value absent those restrictions. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1165, 1192 (1967)). 
86. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
87. Id. at 130.
88. Id.
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Since Penn Central, the Court has emphatically embraced this parcel-as-
a-whole rule, although along the way it has hinted twice that it might have 
wanted to revisit the requirement.89  The Court voiced its last and 
presumably final word on the rule in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.90  The Tahoe-Sierra Court held that a regional 
planning agency’s temporary moratorium on development did not impose a 
categorical taking under Lucas because the properties in question retained 
value as a result of their potential for use in the future.91  The Court based its 
holding on the parcel-as-a-whole rule, explaining that the rule not only has 
a “geographic” (“metes and bounds”) dimension but also a “temporal” 
dimension (period of time covered by the ownership interest in property).92  
Courts must look to the entirety of those interests in evaluating the effect of 
a challenged regulation.93  
In at least one case, however, property owners have asserted that the 
temporal dimension of the parcel-as-a-whole rule should not apply to Penn 
Central challenges.  In an unsuccessful petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the owners in CCA Associates v. U.S. argued that certain dicta in Tahoe-Sierra 
suggests that the Court’s emphatic statement that the parcel-as-a-whole 
rule applies temporally is limited to Lucas challenges.94  In Tahoe-Sierra, the 
Court stated that had the plaintiffs in that case pursued a fact specific as-
applied Penn Central claim, as opposed to a facial Lucas challenge (asserting 
that the moratorium automatically removed all value from hundreds of 
parcels), “some of them might have prevailed.”95  The Court did not expand 
on that statement, and more significantly nowhere hinted that it was meant 
to alter its forceful statement that courts have a duty to follow “Penn Central’s 
admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on ‘the parcel as 
a whole.’”96  The unexplained dicta might have referred to situations such as 
where the use of property is time sensitive—for example, to provide housing 
for a limited term event like the Olympics.  In such a case, the inability to 
use the parcel during its most productive period could have an enormous 
economic impact and thereby support a Penn Central claim.  The restriction 
89. For a more in depth discussion, see Siegel, supra note 1.
90. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 342 (2002). 
91. Id. at 332.
92. Id. at 331-32.
93. Id. at 332.
94. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26-27, CCA Associates v. U.S., (No. 11-
1352) (May 8, 2012), 2012 WL 1636907 (U.S.), 26-27 (2012), petition denied, 133 S. Ct. 
422 (2012), reh’g denied, 11-1352, 2012 WL 5989807 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2012). 
95. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 334.
96. Id. at 332.
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would not support a facial Lucas challenge, however, because some value 
would remain.   
The application of the parcel-as-a-whole approach to temporary 
takings is not only required by caselaw but is supported by the same 
Constitutional and practical considerations that necessitate a high 
economic impact requirement.  For example, like the major diminution 
requirement, the parcel-as-a-whole rule is needed because regulatory 
takings are a judicial construct, closely akin to substantive due process, that 
goes far beyond anything contemplated when the Takings Clause was 
drafted.  As such, applying it expansively would mark a return to the 
excessive judicial activism of the Lochner97 era using the Takings Clause 
rather than the Due Process Clause.98  
V. Conclusion
Some elements of the Court’s economic impact analysis are unsettled.
In particular, the Court has yet to decide whether Transferable Development 
Rights should be a part of that analysis, or are only relevant to whether 
government has provided adequate compensation.  The basic contours of a 
Penn Central and Lucas economic impact analysis, however, are established. 
The Court has set the Penn Central impact bar very high, and requires a parcel 
to be rendered valueless under Lucas.  Moreover, the separation of powers 
and federalism principles underlying our Constitution reinforce the propriety 
of the Court’s approach.  Without the high bar, the federal judiciary would 
have almost unrestrained powers to second guess a wide range of legislative 
and executive decisions, as well as numerous actions of the States and their 
subdivisions.  That high threshold also helps to take into account the 
numerous indirect, difficult to quantify benefits that governmental actions 
provide to regulated properties. 
97. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S 45 (1905).
98. For a more comprehensive discussion of the need for a robust parcel-as-a-
whole rule, see Siegel supra note 1. 
